

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 020484

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA

SUBJECT: PLANNING TALKS PAPER: POLICY ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST  
ASIA

1. THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED BY A MEMBER OF THE DEPARTMENT  
OF STATE'S POLICY PLANNING STAFF. IT HAS NOT BEEN  
OFFICIALLY CLEARED WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. IT REPRESENTS  
THE VIEWS OF THE AUTHOR.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

1. GENERAL SITUATION

FOLLOWING THE INDOCHINA REVERSES IN APRIL THE REGION  
HAS BEEN GENERALLY CALM, ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF THREATS TO  
THE STABILITY OF THE REGION AND OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES  
PERSIST.

STABILIZING ELEMENTS:

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-- THE FIVE ASEAN NATIONS HAVE RECOVERED CONFIDENCE AND DO NOT NOW FEAR ARMED ATTACK OR ALL-OUT SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THEM.

-- ASEAN LEADERS HAVE INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES AND TO PROMOTE REGIONAL COOPERATION.

-- THE FOUR INDOCHINA STATES HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS, ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND POLITICAL REORGANIZATION, INCLUDING UNIFICATION OF THE TWO VIETNAMS.

-- THE POLICIES OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE NOT BEEN AGGRESSIVE OR DISRUPTIVE. PEKING HAS SUBORDINATED ITS IDEOLOGICAL AIMS TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF STATE-TO-STATE DIPLOMACY AND HAS PROMOTED AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THAILAND.

-- THE POLICIES OF JAPAN AND THE US HAVE BEEN STEADY AND MODERATE.

DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS:

-- INSURGENCIES IN THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND BURMA HAVE INTENSIFIED SOMEWHAT. ASEAN LEADERS FEAR THAT US WEAPONS CAPTURED BY HANOI ARE BEING USED IN SUPPORT OF THESE INSURGENCIES.

-- HANOI AND CAMBODIA ARE TAKING A FIRM STAND WITH THAILAND THAT ALL US FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM THAILAND.

HANOI HAS IMPOSED THIS CONDITION TO ANY AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BANGKOK.

-- SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION, ESPECIALLY IN RELATIONS WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES, FORESHADOW MORE INTENSE EFFORTS BY EACH OF THEM TO GAIN ADVANTAGE AND TO CHECK THE OTHER.

-- THREATS TO THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF THE ASEAN  
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NATIONS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS AMONG THEM WEAKEN THEIR ABILITY TO RESIST COMMUNIST PRESSURES OR TO MOVE TOWARD EFFECTIVE REGIONAL COOPERATION.

2. SITUATION IN THE ASEAN NATIONS:

POLITICAL

-- LEADERSHIP IS FOR THE MOST PART EXPERIENCED AND REASONABLY EFFECTIVE BUT WITH AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES. THAILAND'S DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, WHICH IS FRAGILE AND THREATENED FROM RIGHT AND LEFT, WILL BE TESTED IN A GENERAL ELECTION IN APRIL. IN MALAYSIA A NEW PRIME MINISTER FACES AMBITIOUS COMPETITORS FOR POWER. UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL ISSUES THREATEN REGIONAL STABILITY: INDONESIA'S INABILITY TO GAIN FULL CONTROL OF TIMOR, PHILIPPINE CLAIM TO SABAH, MALAYSIA'S DESIGNS ON BRUNEI, AND DISPUTED CLAIMS TO ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. LAW-OF-THE-SEA ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THE POSITION OF INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES, ARE OF CONCERN TO THE US AND JAPAN.

#### ECONOMIC

-- DESPITE GOOD ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES AND SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, MOST SEA COUNTRIES ARE PLAGUED BY WIDESPREAD POVERTY, LOW STANDARD OF LIVING, RAPID POPULATION GROWTH, SERIOUS INFLATION, HIGH COSTS OF ENERGY, AND RECENT DECLINE IN EARNINGS FROM PRIMARY PRODUCTS. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND THE APPEAL OF THIRD WORLD REDISTRIBUTIVE DOCTRINES EXERCISE GROWING APPEAL FOR ASEAN NATIONS.

#### SECURITY

-- INSURGENCIES CONTINUE TO FESTER IN THAILAND, MALAYSIA, AND BURMA, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT NOW POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

-- THE PHILIPPINES IS ABLE TO CONTAIN BUT UNABLE TO REDUCE THE MUSLIM INSURRECTION BY MILITARY OR POLITICAL MEANS.

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-- ASEAN NATIONS MAINTAIN LARGE BUT GENERALLY INEFFECTUAL MILITARY FORCES. COASTAL PATROL UNITS ARE NOT EFFECTIVE.

-- ALL ASEAN NATIONS ARE CURRENTLY RECEIVING US MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN VARIOUS FORMS, BUT CONGRESSIONAL REDUCTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ARE HAVING AN ADVERSE EFFECT.

#### ASEAN COOPERATION

-- SINCE THE FORMATION OF ASEAN IN 1967, ITS PROGRESS IN PROMOTING TRADE, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE COMMON PRICING OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS HAS BEEN MODEST, ALTHOUGH CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC POLICIES HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE.

-- DIFFERING VIEWS EXIST WITHIN ASEAN OVER IMPLEMENTATION OF A PROPOSAL TO NEUTRALIZE THE REGION, THE NEED FOR COOPERATION IN SECURITY MEASURES, AND POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE ORGANIZATION TO INCLUDE BURMA AND THE INDOCHINA STATES.

-- PROSPECTS FOR CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS AT THE ASEAN SUMMIT MEETING IN FEBRUARY 1976 ARE UNCERTAIN.

### 3. INDOCHINA STATES:

#### INTERNAL

-- STRONG LEADERS TRAINED IN REVOLUTION AND STEEPED IN IDEOLOGY ARE FIRMLY IN CONTROL. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE YET MADE A NUMBER OF BASIC DECISIONS ON FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY.

-- WHILE THERE HAS BEEN RESISTANCE TO THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN VARIOUS PARTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS HAS GONE DOWN RECENTLY, AND THE RESISTANCE HAS BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN FACE OF NORTH VIETNAM'S LARGE AND POWERFUL FORCES. AREAS OF RESISTANCE AND DISSIDENCE HAVE DEVELOPED IN CAMBODIA, ESPECIALLY ALONG THE THAI BORDER, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND IN LAOS NORTHEAST OF VIENTIANE, A REGION OCCUPIED LARGELY BY MUONG TRIBES. THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN A SECOND MASS TRANSFER OF POPULATION INTO RURAL AREAS. GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES APPEAR TO BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

-- NORTH VIETNAM WILL COMPLETE THE FORMAL UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM WITH NATIONWIDE ELECTIONS IN APRIL FOR A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, MAKING A STATE OF 45 MILLION

PEOPLE, AND A COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS WILL BE HELD PROBABLY IN JUNE. THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF LAOS IS COMPLETE, AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS EXERCISING INCREASINGLY TIGHT CONTROL.

-- INCOME IS EXTREMELY LOW, CONSUMER GOODS SCARCE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEEDS VERY GREAT. FOOD SUPPLIES APPEAR ADEQUATE, ALTHOUGH DISTRIBUTION IS UNEVEN. ALL THE INDOCHINA GOVERNMENTS HAVE INDICATED AN INTEREST IN OBTAINING FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID. HANOI IS ALSO SHOWING PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE EXPLORATION OF ITS OFFSHORE OIL RESOURCES.

THE US AND THE INDOCHINA STATES

-- ONE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (DEALING WITH MISSING US SERVICEMEN) AND ONE SENATOR HAVE VISITED HANOI RECENTLY; OTHERWISE WE HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH HANOI. THE PUBLIC POSITION OF THE DRV IS THAT THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM REMAINS VALID AND THE US SHOULD CARRY OUT ITS TERMS, IN PARTICULAR THE AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; THE US CONSIDERS THE PARIS AGREEMENT TO BE VOID IN VIEW OF MASSIVE VIOLATIONS BY NORTH VIETNAM. THE DRV HAS MADE SOME SMALL CONCILIATORY GESTURES IN REGARD TO DECEASED US SERVICEMEN.

-- THE ATTITUDE OF THE LAO GOVERNMENT HAS IN RECENT WEEKS BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE CIVIL TOWARD THE SMALL US MISSION. IT HAS STATED IT WANTS A RESUMPTION OF US ECONOMIC AID.

-- WE HAVE HAD NO RECENT CONTACT WITH THE CAMBODIAN  
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AUTHORITIES, AND WE HAVE NO CLEAR IMPRESSION OF THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD US.

-- THE US HAS DECLARED THAT, IF THE INDOCHINA STATES PURSUE CONSTRUCTIVE POLICIES TOWARD US AND THEIR NEIGHBORS, WE WOULD ENVISAGE THE EVENTUAL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THEM AND THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED IN THE INTERIM TO CONSIDER PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN SUCH FIELDS AS TRAVEL AND TRADE. AS REGARDS PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WE HAVE NOT OBJECTED TO THE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA TAKING THE SEATS OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENTS. WE OPPOSED ADMISSION OF THE TWO VIETNAMS INTO THE UN BECAUSE THE ROK WAS REJECTED IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL MEMBERSHIP. WE HAVE LICENSED PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND SOME ECONOMIC AID TO NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, BUT WE HAVE NO PLANS TO UNDERTAKE OFFICIAL AID PROGRAMS. NOR HAVE WE AUTHORIZED PRIVATE AMERICANS TO ENGAGE IN TRADE WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES.

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN ASEAN NATIONS AND INDOCHINA STATES:

VIEWS OF ASEAN NATIONS

-- ALL HAVE DECLARED THEY WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES AND ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE ASEAN STATES HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE ACTIVE INTERCHANGE TAKING PLACE.

-- MALAYSIA AND THAILAND HAVE FAVORED AN EARLY INVITA-

TION TO THE INDOCHINA STATES TO JOIN ASEAN, WHILE THE OTHER ASEAN NATIONS IN VARYING DEGREES OPPOSE THIS.

-- ALL THE ASEAN NATIONS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE COMMUNIST-AIDED INSURGENCIES IN SEA AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT HANOI MIGHT RESORT TO DIRECT MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST THEM IN THE FUTURE. THAILAND AND MALAYSIA IN PARTICULAR HOPE THAT A CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE TOWARD THE INDOCHINA STATES MIGHT REDUCE THESE THREATS. AT THE SAME TIME MILITARY AND AT LEAST SOME CIVILIAN LEADERS IN THAILAND APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT A SMALL NON-COMBAT U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE WILL ENHANCE ITS SECURITY.  
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#### VIEWS OF THE INDOCHINA STATES

-- THEY ARE CONTINUING THEIR LONG-STANDING SUPPORT TO INSURGENTS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND AND HAVE APPARENTLY STIMULATED BORDER INCIDENTS ON THE THAI BORDER. NEITHER THAILAND NOR MALAYSIA, HOWEVER, SEEMS UNDULY CONCERNED BY THESE ACTIONS.

-- HANOI HAS TAKEN THE OFFICIAL POSITION IN TALKS WITH THE THAI THAT IT WILL NOT OPEN RELATIONS UNTIL U.S. FORCES ARE REMOVED FROM THAILAND AND MILITARY MATERIAL REMOVED FROM VIETNAM AT THE END OF THE FIGHTING IN THE SPRING OF 1975 IS RETURNED. THE THAI GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THESE POSITIONS BUT DOES NOT NOW INTEND TO YIELD ON EITHER. CAMBODIA HAS JOINED WITH NORTH VIETNAM IN STATING THAT U.S. FORCES SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THAILAND.

-- NORTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA HAVE RECENTLY STATED THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN JOINING ASEAN.

#### FUTURE PROSPECTS

-- THE INTERESTS, POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATIONS OF THE ASEAN NATIONS AND THE INDOCHINA STATES ARE CLEARLY DIVERGENT. IN PARTICULAR, THE GOOD RELATIONS OF ALL THE ASEAN NATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THEIR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL CONSTRAIN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE TIES WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES.

-- THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN NON-HOSTILE RELATIONS WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS AND WILL GO TO SOME LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THEM.

-- FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IT WOULD APPEAR THAT BORDER

INCIDENTS AND INSURGENCIES WILL GO ON, BUT THAT LARGE-SCALE CONFRONTATION IS NOT LIKELY, PARTICULARLY WHILE THE INDO-CHINA STATES DEAL WITH THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND SEARCH FOR A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS.

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## 5.CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

### RELATIONS WITH INDOCHINA STATES

-- THROUGH CLOSE RELATIONS WITH HANOI, EVIDENCED BY LE DUAN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND THE SOVIET-NORTH VIETNAM AID AGREEMENT, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN THE CLEAR GAINERS FROM THE INDOCHINA WARS. SOVIET ECONOMIC RESOURCES SEEM TO GIVE IT AN ADVANTAGE OVER THE PRC IN DEALING WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH HANOI SEEM TO BE CORRECT BUT NOT FRIENDLY; TERRITORIAL DISPUTES OVER ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA COULD EXACERBATE RELATIONS.

-- IN LAOS THE SOVIETS HAVE GREATER INFLUENCE WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS AND TECHNICIANS NOW PRESENT THERE. THE PRC, HOWEVER, IS CONTINUING ITS ROAD-BUILDING PROJECT IN LAOS.

-- IN CAMBODIA, CHINESE INFLUENCE SEEMS GREATER. PRC ENCOURAGEMENT WAS APPARENTLY A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN CAMBODIA'S DECISION TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THAILAND.

### RELATIONS WITH ASEAN NATIONS

-- CHINA HAS MADE MODEST GAINS (DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MALAYSIA, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES), BUT NEITHER THE PRC NOR THE SOVIET UNION HAS PARTICULARLY WARM RELATIONS WITH ANY OF THE ASEAN STATES. THE PRC HAS PUBLICLY ENDORSED THE EFFORT OF THE ASEAN STATES TO PROMOTE REGIONAL COOPERATION, AND THREE ASEAN STATES WITH WHOM THE PRC HAS RELATIONS HAVE ENDORSED THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO POWER SHOULD HAVE HEGEMONY IN THE REGION. ALL ASEAN STATES ARE WARY OF THE PRC BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY AND POWER, THEIR CHINESE MINORITIES, THE PRC'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND BURMA, AND THE PRC UNWILLINGNESS TO RENOUNCE

### PARTY-TO-PARTY COOPERATION WITH FELLOW COMMUNISTS.

-- ALL ASEAN NATIONS SEE THE SOVIET UNION AS A LESSER THREAT BECAUSE OF ITS DISTANCE AND BECAUSE OF ITS UTILITY  
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AS A FOIL AGAINST ITS RIVAL IN PEKING. NONE HAS ANY ENTHUSIASM FOR THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR AN ASIAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, WHICH THEY CONSIDER A MOSCOW GAMBIT INTENDED TO OUTFLANK PEKING; MOSCOW, ON THE OTHER HAND, MIGHT SEE AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE ASEAN NEUTRALIZATION PROPOSAL FOR LINKAGE WITH THE BREZHNEV SCHEME. MOSCOW AND MANILA WILL PROBABLY ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE COURSE OF 1976.

-- AS REGARDS THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN SEA, NEITHER CHINA NOR THE SOVIET UNION GIVES IT PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT, BUT BOTH PROBABLY CONSIDER IT A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON EXPANSIONIST ASPIRATIONS BY THE OTHER. THE PRC HAS NOT ENCOURAGED THE THAI OR THE PHILIPPINES TO PRESS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES, THUS GIVING TACIT ENDORSEMENT TO OUR PRESENCE.

#### 6.US POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THESE HAVE BEEN RECENTLY RESTATED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

-- A CONTINUING STRONG US ROLE ENABLING THE US TO PRESERVE A FIRM AND BALANCED MILITARY POSTURE IN THE REGION AND TO OPPOSE ANY FORM OF HEGEMONY.

-- A CONTINUED STAKE IN STABILITY AND SECURITY IN SEA, INCLUDING IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE FIVE ASEAN NATIONS. WE RETAIN CLOSE AND VALUABLE TIES WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

-- EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW STRUCTURE OF STABILITY IN SEA, INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND THE EVENTUAL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES IF THEY PURSUE CONSTRUCTIVE POLICIES TOWARD US AND THEIR NEIGHBORS.

-- PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION REFLECTING THE ASPIRATIONS OF ALL PEOPLES IN THE REGION.

IN FURTHERANCE OF THESE POLICIES, THE US WILL ENGAGE IN  
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NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES REGARDING MILITARY BASES AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND WITH THAILAND REGARDING OUR MILITARY PRESENCE THERE. WE WILL ALSO ENGAGE IN GENERAL



CONSULTATIONS WITH INDONESIA AT A MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND

POSSIBLY WITH ASEAN ON ECONOMIC SUBJECTS.

CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES WILL CONTINUE TO AFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY US POLICIES TOWARD SEA. ALTHOUGH THERE IS PROBABLY GENERAL SUPPORT IN THE US FOR OUR BROAD POLICY GOALS THERE, SEVERAL SPECIFIC PROBLEMS EXIST:

-- IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE INDOCHINA STATES, IN PARTICULAR ANY OFFER TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID, WILL BE OPPOSED BY MANY IN THE CONGRESS, AT LEAST SO LONG AS THE ACCOUNTING OF US SERVICEMEN LOST IN THE INDOCHINA CONFLICT IS INCOMPLETE, AND EVEN AFTER THAT.

-- REPRESSION OF CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS BY CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS, NOTABLY THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA, WILL CONTINUE TO STIR OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS.

-- INDONESIA'S OIL RESOURCES AND MEMBERSHIP IN OPEC WILL LIMIT SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS FOR AID TO JAKARTA.

-- VOTING PATTERNS IN THE UN ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE US, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE DESIRE OF ASEAN NATIONS TO IMPROVE THEIR CREDENTIALS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, WILL CAUSE UNHAPPINESS IN WASHINGTON.

-- MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAS COME UNDER INCREASINGLY CLOSE SCRUTINY AND CONTROL BY THE CONGRESS, AND SUBMISSIONS BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ARE LIKELY TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED, ESPECIALLY REQUESTS FOR GRANT ASSISTANCE.

-- ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS WILL ALSO BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED BUT ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE SEVERELY PRUNED.

## 7. ISSUES TO CONSIDER

REGARDING THE ASEAN NATIONS  
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HOW SERIOUS ARE THE THREATS TO THEIR STABILITY, ESPECIALLY IN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA?

ARE INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES MORE IMPORTANT TO THE US AND JAPAN THAN THE OTHERS IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY TERMS?

DOES BURMA MERIT MORE THAN THE MINIMAL ATTENTION WE ARE GIVING IT?

SHOULD THE US AND JAPAN TAKE PRACTICAL MEASURES TO PROMOTE COOPERATION WITH THE ASEAN GROUP, SUCH AS ECONOMIC

CONSULTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSALS IN THE KISSINGER UNGA SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1975?

CAN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN SEA? IS SOME KIND OF PACIFIC ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE ASEAN STATES, A FEASIBLE IDEA?

DOES THE ASEAN NEUTRALIZATION PROPOSAL POSE ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEMS, AS IN CONNECTION WITH THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES OR IN REGARD TO LAW OF THE SEA?

REGARDING THE INDOCHINA STATES

WILL IC STATES BE PREOCCUPIED FOR SOME TIME WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, OR WILL THEY FOLLOW POLICIES OF PUTTING SUBVERSIVE AND MILITARY PRESSURE ON THEIR ASEAN NEIGHBORS?

WHAT FACTORS WILL BE MOST SIGNIFICANT IN DETERMINING THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE IC STATES -- ECONOMIC NEEDS, MANAGEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE PRC AND SOVIET UNION, ATTITUDES OF THE ASEAN STATES, JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, US POLICY?

THE US AND JAPAN HAVE DIFFERENT POLICIES TOWARD THE  
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INDOCHINA STATES, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE. THE US FORESEES A SLOW EVOLUTION TOWARD NORMAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS IF THE INDOCHINA STATES SHOW UNDERSTANDING OF OUR CONCERNS AND THOSE OF THEIR NEIGHBORS. WHAT ADVANTAGES DOES JAPAN SEE IN ITS POLICIES OF MORE RAPID ACCOMMODATION?

CAN WE PROMOTE SEPARATISM AMONG THE IC STATES, AS BY A RELATIVELY FAVORABLE POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA? WHAT WOULD BE THE ELEMENTS OF SUCH A POLICY?

REGARDING CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

IS EITHER CHINA OR THE SOVIET UNION LIKELY TO WANT AND BE ABLE TO GAIN A DOMINANT POSITION IN INDOCHINA OR THROUGHOUT SEA?

SHOULD THE US AND JAPAN "TILT" TOWARD CHINA ON THE  
GROUND THAT THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS AT PRESENT TO HAVE  
THE STRONGER POSITION IN INDOCHINA? KISSINGER

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